The Union army’s policy of destruction was tactical and strategic. According to Carr, commanders and individual soldiers hated all things in the South, hence, their decision to Virginia and Georgia. The general feeling was that the secession did not justify the carnage on either side. The Union army had lost thousands of men, endured rocky terrain, and engaged in bloody and costly battles. After a prolonged war, the Northern forces became emotionally hardened and indifferent to civilians in Georgia and Virginia. They took food from defenseless citizens, destroyed homes, and burnt plantations because of their hatred of the Confederacy.
Another argument advanced is that the destruction was a military strategy to weaken the confederate military capability. By 1864, the Civil War had been going on for three years, with a great death toll on either side. The policy of destruction was a response to the prolonged and costly war. The Union army sought to end this conflict by weakening the South’s capacity to fight. Led by William Sherman, the soldiers at first destroyed critical infrastructure, including railroads, ginneries, and other installations in key cities such as Atlanta to cripple the revenue streams of the confederate states and bring them into surrender. When this did not work, they resorted to burning crops and towns and seizing livestock.
From a tactical perspective, the cruelty meted out on Georgians and Virginians was meant to force the Confederacy into submission. After a prolonged war, there was no other option. The Union army marched through South Carolina, the state where secessionist calls first emerged, leaving devastation in its wake. It terrorized the locals and damaged the infrastructure critical to the South’s war effort. This psychological tactic resulted in a demoralized confederate force with soldiers concerned over the welfare of their families. Some deserted to return to their homelands.