Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection?

According to Smart, the mind-brain theory asserts that mental processes and events are similar to brain events, processes, and states. It is because physical types are mental types and not mere tokens. He points out that the main objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that an individual who does not know anything about the brain can know things about sensations, pains, and after-images. All these are brain processes that can be felt physically. However, Place makes a distinction between the definition and composition of the “is” to explain the mind-brain identity theory objection.

According to Place, the identity theory describes mental states which are similar to brain states, the same way one can equate water to H2O. He objects to the assertion that such an assumption is a matter of empirical fact which presumes that mental states are composed materially of the brain state. He instead argues that it is possible to state that similar types of mental states have different physical realizers under different circumstances.

He goes further to state that objects possess functional properties based on what they do or perform and not what they are composed of. For instance, an individual can claim the title of a teacher even though he is a young man. The two are totally independent of each other. An object is said to have functional properties when it entails a state, component, or process that performs a specific role. Roles can be said to be causal terms when they respond to specific causal inputs using certain types of outputs.

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Academic.Tips. (2023) 'Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection'. 12 February.

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Academic.Tips. (2023, February 12). Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection? https://academic.tips/question/smart-points-out-that-one-possible-objection-to-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-is-that-someone-who-knows-nothing-about-the-brain-can-know-and-talk-about-pains-sensations-toothaches-and-after-images/

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Academic.Tips. 2023. "Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection?" February 12, 2023. https://academic.tips/question/smart-points-out-that-one-possible-objection-to-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-is-that-someone-who-knows-nothing-about-the-brain-can-know-and-talk-about-pains-sensations-toothaches-and-after-images/.

1. Academic.Tips. "Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection?" February 12, 2023. https://academic.tips/question/smart-points-out-that-one-possible-objection-to-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-is-that-someone-who-knows-nothing-about-the-brain-can-know-and-talk-about-pains-sensations-toothaches-and-after-images/.


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Academic.Tips. "Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection?" February 12, 2023. https://academic.tips/question/smart-points-out-that-one-possible-objection-to-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-is-that-someone-who-knows-nothing-about-the-brain-can-know-and-talk-about-pains-sensations-toothaches-and-after-images/.

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"Smart points out that one possible objection to the mind-brain identity theory is that someone who knows nothing about the brain can know and talk about pains, sensations, toothaches, and after-images. Thus, when they report a sensation, they are not reporting a brain process. How does Place’s distinction between the “is” of definition and the “is” of composition help to address this potential objection?" Academic.Tips, 12 Feb. 2023, academic.tips/question/smart-points-out-that-one-possible-objection-to-the-mind-brain-identity-theory-is-that-someone-who-knows-nothing-about-the-brain-can-know-and-talk-about-pains-sensations-toothaches-and-after-images/.

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